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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests nancial intermediaries increase risky investments when
interest rates are low. We develop a model consistent with this observation and ask
whether the risks undertaken exceed the social optimum. Interest rate policy a¤ects
risk taking in the model through two opposing channels. First, low policy rates make
riskier assets more attractive than safe bonds. Second, low policy rates reduce the
amount of safe bonds available for collateralized borrowing in interbank markets. The
calibrated model features excessive risk taking at the optimal policy. However, at low
policy rates, collateral constraints tighten and risk taking doesnt exceed the social
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1 Introduction
The late-2000s global nancial crisis has renewed interest in the determinants of portfolio
investments into safe and risky assets by nancial intermediaries. A view advanced in the
aftermath of the crisis is that during extended periods of low interest rates nancial inter-
mediaries take on excessive risks. The idea that interest rate policy a¤ects risk taking by
intermediaries also referred to as the risk taking channel of monetary policy, a term coined
by Borio and Zhu (2012) prompted a recent empirical literature. One main nding of this
literature is a negative relationship between the level of interest rates and bank risk taking.1
In light of this observation, it has been argued that central banks could have prevented
the build-up of risk in the run-up to the recent nancial crisis and the ensuing negative
consequences for the macroeconomy by raising interest rates.2
An important caveat is that the empirical literature is silent about the optimality of risk
taking by intermediaries. Financing riskier investments (i.e. with high variance and high
expected return) when interest rates are low may well be socially optimal. Thus, assessing
whether intermediaries risk taking is excessive is key for determining whether monetary
policy should actively aim to curtail such risks. We contribute to this debate by developing
a quantitative model to measure if the risks undertaken by intermediaries when interest rates
are low exceed the social optimum.
A main feature of our model is that nancial intermediaries can alter their portfolio
investments by using safe assets as collateral in interbank borrowing. Although collateralized
borrowing is a primary margin of balance sheet adjustment for intermediaries (Adrian and
Shin (2010)), it has not received a lot of attention in quantitative macro studies. The tight
1DellAriccia, Laeven, and Marquez (2014) and de Nicolò, DellAriccia, Laeven, and Valencia (2010)
document a negative relationship between the real fed funds rate and the riskiness of U.S. banksassets.
Others use nominal interest rate data to establish a negative relationship to bank risk taking in di¤erent
countries, e.g. Gambacorta (2009), Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydró (2015), Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and
Saurina (2014), Delis and Kouretas (2011) and Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibane (2014).
2For example, Taylor (2009) argues that monetary policy was low for too long in the run-up to the crisis.
Borio and Zhu (2012) and Agur and Demertzis (2013) discuss "leaning against the wind", the idea that
monetary policy should tighten as soon as nancial risks build up.
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empirical relationship between monetary policy rates and the cost of collateralized interbank
borrowing (Bech, Klee, and Stebunovs (2012)), as well as the shortage of collateral and
reductions in interbank borrowing observed in the recent crisis (Gorton (2010)) motivate us
to model collateralized borrowing when examining intermediariesrisk taking incentives.
To conduct our analysis, we develop a dynamic model with persistent aggregate shocks
and idiosyncratic uncertainty in which the monetary authority inuences the real interest rate
on safe bonds.3 Each period, intermediaries with limited liability are funded through insured
deposits and equity from households which they allocate to safe bonds and risky projects.
The latter are investments in rms, whose returns are correlated with aggregate produc-
tivity.4 The combination of limited liability and deposit insurance creates a moral hazard
problem, which generates the potential for intermediaries to overinvest in risky projects.5
After the initial portfolio decision, intermediaries nd out whether they hold high-risk
projects, with high variance of returns, or low-risk projects, with low variance of returns.
Given this information, intermediaries reoptimize their portfolios using collateralized borrow-
ing in the interbank market. During an expansion, when aggregate productivity is expected
to be high, intermediaries with high-risk projects which we term high-risk intermediaries
trade their risk-free bonds to invest more into their risky projects. These projects are rela-
tively attractive from a social point of view due to their high expected return, and are even
more attractive for intermediaries because potential losses in the event of a contraction are
avoided through limited liability (as in Allen and Gale (2000)). Low-risk intermediaries on
the other side of the transaction accept bonds and reduce exposure to their risky projects,
which have lower expected returns. In this framework, we dene risk taking as excessive if
3We do not model the changes in nominal interest rates that are needed to deliver the real rates im-
plemented in our model. Having the nominal interest rate as a policy instrument would enrich the policy
insights by introducing additional trade-o¤s. For example, the monetary authority may choose to keep nom-
inal interest rates low because the recovery of the economy from a recession is weak, or because ination is
falling (Bernanke (2010)). Analyzing these additional trade-o¤s is beyond the scope of this paper.
4In our model, the investment market is segmented in that households cannot invest directly in the risky
projects of some rms and are forced to use intermediaries. This is similar to Gale (2004).
5We note that moral hazard leads to a failure of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem, see Hellwig
(1981) and Myers (2003).
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investments in high-risk projects in the decentralized economy exceed the social optimum,
dened as the solution to a social planner problem.
In the model, collateralized borrowing can be interpreted as repurchase agreements (re-
pos).6 Empirically, repos are largely collateralized using government bonds (Krishnamurthy,
Nagel, and Orlov (2014)). Consistent with this evidence, intermediaries in our model use
government bonds as collateral for borrowing. The implicit theoretical assumption is that
government bonds are special because there is no information asymmetry about their value.7
Collateralized borrowing in our model is benecial because it facilitates reallocation of
resources between intermediaries in response to new information about the riskiness of their
investments. However, borrowing against safe bonds also allows intermediaries to take ad-
vantage of their limited liability and to overinvest in risky projects. This is socially costly
because intermediaries can go bankrupt, in which case, payments to depositors are guar-
anteed by government-funded deposit insurance. The monetary authoritys role is to set
interest rate policy so as to mitigate the moral hazard problem of intermediaries. This is
achieved by making the collateral constraint of intermediaries bind.
The inclusion of collateralized borrowing acts as an opposing force on the propensity to
take on risk by nancial intermediaries. On the one hand, our model captures the standard
portfolio choice result that a risk averse investors optimal investment into risky assets is
decreasing in the return to safe assets (Merton (1969), Samuelson (1969) and Fishburn and
Porter (1976)).8 On the other hand, at low interest rates, limited amounts of safe assets
constrain collateralized interbank borrowing and ultimately result in reduced risk taking by
intermediaries. We term the opposing channels through which interest rate policy inuences
risk taking by intermediaries as the portfolio and the collateral channel, respectively.
6A repo transaction is a sale of a security and a simultaneous agreement to repurchase the security at a
future date. Repos are secured loans in which the borrower receives money against collateral.
7In the run-up to the recent nancial crisis, some assets, such as asset-backed securities, used as collateral
in the repo market were not truly safe (see Gorton (2010), Gorton and Metrick (2012), Krishnamurthy,
Nagel, and Orlov (2014) and Hoerdahl and King (2008)). This type of collateral disappeared from the repo
market as the crisis unfolded. Considering other types of collateral assets is an interesting extension of our
model, that we leave for future work.
8This idea is also the basis of Rajan (2006), who discusses excessive risk in the nancial sector.
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To gain intuition about the qualitative trade-o¤s implied by the two channels, we examine
a simplied version of our model with i.i.d. aggregate shocks. In this case, we can derive
analytical results on risk taking. We show that if equity is su¢ ciently high, there exists
an interest rate policy which implements the socially optimal investments as a competitive
equilibrium. The intuition is that, with high enough equity, the moral hazard problem of
intermediaries is reduced and intermediaries do not go bankrupt, as most of their liabilities
are state-contingent.
If equity of nancial intermediaries is relatively low (as observed in U.S. data), the equi-
librium investments in risky projects no longer coincide with the social optimum. In this
case, the collateral channel provides a safeguard against increased risk taking, especially at
low interest rates. Namely, low policy rates lead intermediaries to purchase fewer safe bonds
(portfolio channel), and thus have less collateral available for interbank borrowing (collateral
channel). The collateral channel dominates, as scarce collateral constrains high-risk interme-
diaries who have the strongest incentives to overinvest in risky projects during expansions.
Thus, low policy rates lower investments in risky projects in the competitive equilibrium and
reduce risk taking during expansions.
A drawback of the assumption of i.i.d. aggregate shocks is that the model cannot match
the negative relationship between interest rates and risky investments observed during ex-
tended periods of expansion. To be consistent with this empirical observation, we calibrate
the model with persistent aggregate shocks to the U.S. economy and conduct numerical ex-
periments. First, we solve for the optimal interest rate policy which maximizes households
welfare. Second, we consider upward or downward shifts in the interest rate schedule, to
evaluate risk taking behavior when interest rates are either lower or higher than optimal.
Our numerical results are consistent with the empirical nding that intermediaries take
on more risks when interest rates are low. Expansions in our decentralized economy are
characterized by optimally declining interest rates and feature higher investments in risky
projects. However, the socially optimal amount of investments in risky assets also rises
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in expansions. At the optimal interest rate policy, risky investments in the competitive
equilibrium exceed the social planners by about 5 percent, on average, but the associated
welfare losses are small.9 Moreover, as in the simple model, lower than optimal interest rates
lead to reductions in risk taking by nancial intermediaries.
Higher than optimal interest rates entail larger welfare losses in our environment com-
pared to lower than optimal interest rates. At higher interest rates, intermediaries purchase
more safe bonds (portfolio channel), which leads to a relaxation of their collateral con-
straint and allows for more borrowing in the interbank market (collateral channel). Our
paper makes an important contribution by highlighting that relaxing collateral constraints
increases risk taking with adverse e¤ects for real activity and welfare. This insight is in con-
trast to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) where shocks to credit-constrained rms are amplied
and transmitted to output through changes in collateral values. In their framework, relaxing
collateral constraints is benecial.
Several papers in the literature build quantitative models to illustrate that nancial
frictions in interbank markets magnify downturns and lead to banking crises. Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012) focus on various policies that
can help mitigate a crisis; Boissay, Collard, and Smets (2016) emphasize that banking crises
are due to excessive credit booms which trigger large declines in interest rates and interbank
market freezes.10 Similar to these papers, our model features borrowing constraints in the
interbank market. Moreover, a shutdown in the interbank market occurs whenever interest
rates are su¢ ciently low, just as in Boissay, Collard, and Smets (2016). Our contribution
9The average is taken over expansions and contractions.
10These papers augment quantitative macro models with nancial amplication mechanisms à la Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). There is also a broad theoretical literature that examines
related aspects of nancial intermediation. For example, DellAriccia, Laeven, and Marquez (2014) build a
model to examine the link between interest rates and bank risk taking in an environment where leverage
is either endogenous or exogenous. Drees, Eckwert, and Várdy (2013) argue that the impact of interest
rates on risk taking depends on the source of risk. Challe, Mojon, and Ragot (2013) study risk taking when
the nancial system is opaque. Dubecq, Mojon, and Ragot (2015) study the interaction between capital
regulation and risk. Stein (1998) examines the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in a model
in which banksportfolio choices respond to changes in the availability of nancing via insured deposits.
Diamond and Rajan (2009), Acharya and Naqvi (2012) and Agur and Demertzis (2013) examine the optimal
policy when the monetary authority has a nancial stability objective.
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relative to these papers is to show that binding collateral constraints in the interbank market
are desirable, as they limit excessive risk taking.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the decentralized environ-
ment, the social planners problem and the measurement of risk taking. Section 3 presents
equilibrium properties of our full model, and results from the version of our model with i.i.d.
aggregate shocks. Section 4 describes the quantitative analysis and Section 5 concludes.
2 Model Economy
The economy is populated by households, nancial intermediaries, nonnancial rms and a
government. The rationale for the existence of intermediation is the same as in Gale (2004):
households are excluded from directly investing in some of the risky assets available in the
economy and are forced to use nancial intermediaries.
Time is discrete and innite. Each period, the economy is subject to an exogenous aggre-
gate shock which a¤ects the productivity of all rms. In addition, nancial intermediaries
are subject to idiosyncratic shocks which determine their type, j 2 fh; lg. The aggregate
shock st 2 fs; sg follows a rst-order Markov process. The history of aggregate shocks up to
time t is st: The idiosyncratic shock is i.i.d. across time and across nancial intermediaries.
A summary of the timing of events in our model is presented in Figure 1.
2.1 Financial Sector
We describe the nancial sector rst, as it comprises the innovative features of our model.
Financial intermediaries choose portfolios of safe and risky investments to maximize ex-
pected prots. Three features make the portfolio choices interesting. Intermediaries have
limited liability and are partly funded through insured deposits.11 In combination, these two
11Our analysis is focused on the risk taking incentives of deposit taking institutions. While risk taking
incentives of other types of intermediaries have been analyzed in the literature (e.g. Chevalier and Ellison
(1997) and Palomino and Prat (2003)), they are beyond the scope of this paper.
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features create a moral hazard problem which makes risky investments attractive for inter-
mediaries. Moreover, within each period, intermediaries can borrow or lend against collateral
through an interbank market in order to change the scale of their risky investments after
nding out their type. Collateralized interbank borrowing is the novel feature of our model.
There is a measure 1   m of nancial intermediaries who make two portfolio decisions
each period. At the rst stage, the type j 2 fh; lg and the aggregate shock st 2 fs; sg are
unknown. Financial intermediaries are identical, so they receive the same amounts of de-
posits and equity from households and make the same portfolio investments into government
bonds, b (st 1), and risky projects, k (st 1). The latter are investments into the production
technologies of small rms and can be one of two types: high-risk projects with productivity
qh (st) and low-risk projects with productivity ql (st). For simplicity, we do not model loans
between nancial intermediaries and the small rms, but rather assume that intermediaries
operate their production technology directly.12
After the initial investment decisions, intermediaries acquire more information about the
riskiness of their projects. With probability j, the project an intermediary previously in-
vested into is of type j 2 fh; lg. The probabilities, h and l = 1   h, are time and state
invariant and known. We refer to intermediaries at this second portfolio stage as being
high-risk or low-risk, based on the type j of their risky projects. We assume that high-risk
nancial intermediaries are more productive during a good aggregate state (st = s), and
less productive during a bad state (st = s), compared to low-risk nancial intermediaries.
Formally, qh (s) > ql (s)  ql (s) > qh (s) : We also assume that it is not possible for in-
termediaries to trade contingent claims on their projects. However, once type j is known,
but before the realization of the aggregate shock st; intermediaries may trade bonds in the
interbank market in order to adjust the amount of resources invested into the risky projects.
The resulting capital, kj (st 1), is invested into the production technologies of the small
rms. Here, kj (st 1)  k (st 1) + ~p (st 1)~bj (st 1) where k (st 1) is the rst stage portfolio
12Implicitly, we abstract from information problems à la Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
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investment and ~bj (st 1) are bonds traded at the interbank market price ~p (st 1).
The assumption regarding the timing of shocks is crucial for the existence of an inter-
bank market in this model. In particular, if j and st were known at the beginning of each
period, then resources from households would be allocated to intermediaries so as to equalize
marginal rates of return, and there would be no need for an interbank market. The timing
assumption which gives rise to the two stages of an intermediarys portfolio choice is meant
to capture the idea that information about the riskiness of projects evolves over time. As
a result, nancial intermediaries adjust their portfolios, but may be constrained in their
choices by the amount of bonds, b (st 1), available as collateral for interbank borrowing.
After the two portfolio decisions, the aggregate shock, st, realizes at the beginning
of period t. Intermediaries choose labor demand, lj (st), and produce using technology
qj (st) [kj (s
t 1)] [lj (st)]
1  , where parameters  and  satisfy 1        0 with ;  2
[0; 1]. If  > 0 there is a xed factor present in the production process, whose returns are paid
to equityholders. As outlined in Section 4:1, the xed factor  helps our model match the
equity to total asset ratio of the U.S. nancial sector. Following production, intermediaries
unable to pay the promised rate of return to deposits declare bankruptcy.
We now describe in detail the stages of an intermediarys problem.
Portfolio Choice in the Bond Market
Financial intermediaries maximize expected prots. Since households own the nancial inter-
mediaries, prots at history st are valued at the householdsmarginal utility of consumption
(weighted by the probability of history st), denoted  (st) :
At the rst stage of the portfolio decision, the type j 2 fh; lg and the aggregate shock
st 2 fs; sg are unknown. A nancial intermediary chooses deposit demand, d (st 1), safe
bonds, b (st 1), and risky investments, k (st 1) to solve the problem (P1). An intermediary
takes as given the bonds traded in the interbank market, ~bj (st 1), and the labor input,
lj (s
t). Note that ~bj (st 1) is chosen after the type, j, is realized, while lj (st) is chosen after
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the type, j, and the aggregate shock, st, are realized. In addition, an intermediary takes as
given  (st), all prices and the amount of equity chosen by households, z (st 1).13
max
fd(st 1); b(st 1), k(st 1)g
X
j2fh;lg
j
X
stjst 1

 
st

Vj
 
st

(P1)
subject to:
z
 
st 1

+ d
 
st 1

= k
 
st 1

+ p
 
st 1

b
 
st 1

(1)
Vj
 
st

= max
8>>>><>>>>:
266664
qj (st)
h
k (st 1) + ~p (st 1)~bj (st 1)
i
[lj (s
t)]
1  
+qj (st) (1  )
h
k (st 1) + ~p (st 1)~bj (st 1)
i
+
h
b (st 1)  ~bj (st 1)
i
 Wj (st) lj (st) Rd (st 1) d (st 1)
377775 ; 0
9>>>>=>>>>; (2)
Here, Vj (st) are prots for intermediary j 2 fh; lg at history st which are paid to equity
holders, p (st 1) is the bond price, ~p (st 1) is the interbank market price, Wj (st) is the wage
rate paid by a nancial intermediary of type j and Rd (st 1) is the return to deposits.
The balance sheet of an intermediary (equation (1)) shows that investments are funded
through equity, z (st 1), and deposits, d (st 1). The main di¤erence between these two forms
of funding is that equity returns are contingent on the realization of the aggregate state in
the period when they are paid, while returns to deposits are not (i.e. Vj (st) depends on st;
while Rd (st 1) does not). In addition, equity returns are bounded below by zero due to the
limited liability of intermediaries (i.e. Vj (st) cannot be negative as seen in equation (2)),
while deposit returns are guaranteed by deposit insurance. The limited liability introduces
an asymmetry in that it allows intermediaries to make investment decisions that bring prots
in good aggregate states, while being shielded from losses in bad states.
In equation (2) ; the undepreciated capital stock of rms is adjusted by the productivity
level, i.e. qj (st) multiplies (1  ) kj (st 1) where  is the depreciation rate, and kj (st 1) 
13Due to limited liability and deposit insurance, nancial intermediaries prefer to be funded via deposits
rather than equity. To avoid zero equity nancing (which is not supported by U.S. data), we assume that
equity is determined by households. Some alternative modelling choices which we do not pursue in this
paper are to assume an agency problem (e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)) or to impose a nancial capital
regulation constraint (e.g. Van den Heuvel (2009)), both of which result in intermediaries holding equity.
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k (st 1)+ ~p (st 1)~bj (st 1). This allows for variation in the value of capital, similar to Merton
(1973) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). The idea is that while capital may not depreciate
in a physical sense during contraction periods, it does so in an economic sense.14
Portfolio Adjustments via the Interbank Market
Once nancial intermediaries nd out their type j 2 fh; lg, they may adjust the riskiness
of their portfolios by trading bonds, ~bj (st 1), amongst themselves. Intermediaries choose
~bj (s
t 1) and, implicitly, kj (st 1)  k (st 1) + ~p (st 1)~bj (st 1) to solve the problem (P2) :
Intermediaries take as given the choices made at the rst stage portfolio decision, d (st 1) ;
b (st 1), k (st 1). As before, intermediaries also take as given lj (st),  (st), all prices and
equity, z (st 1).
max
f~bj(st 1), kj(st 1)g
X
stjst 1

 
st

Vj
 
st

(P2)
subject to:   k (s
t 1)
~p (st 1)
 ~bj
 
st 1
  b  st 1
where Vj (st) is dened in equation (2). Inada conditions guarantee that kj (st 1)  k (st 1)+
~p (st 1)~bj (st 1) > 0, and hence the only potentially binding constraint in problem (P2) is
~bj (s
t 1)  b (st 1). Here, ~bj (st 1) can be interpreted as sales of bonds or, alternatively, as
repurchasing agreements (repos).15 We abstract from haircuts on collateral.16
14In a case study of aerospace plants, Ramey and Shapiro (2001) show that the decrease in the value of in-
stalled capital at plants that discontinued operations is higher than the actual depreciation rate. In addition,
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) provide evidence that costs of capital reallocation are strongly countercyclical.
15While we model ~bj
 
st 1

as bond sales, incorporating explicitly the repurchase of bonds which is typical
in a repo agreement would yield identical results. Specically, if no bankruptcy occurs, then intermediaries
have the resources necessary to repurchase the bonds from the counterparty. This simply amounts to a
reshu­ ing of prots among intermediaries, before these prots are paid as returns to equityholders. When
some intermediaries go bankrupt, they are unable to repurchase the bonds and the counterparty keeps
them, as is true in the data. Equityholders receive no returns from bankrupt intermediaries. In either case,
payments to equityholders are identical regardless of whether we model the repurchase of bonds or not.
16A repo transaction may require the borrower to pledge collateral in excess of the loan received. For
example, Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014) document that average haircuts vary between 2 and 7
percent by type of collateral. Currently, our model abstracts from haircuts in the repo market. Introducing
a xed haircut in the model would not change our results, since the equilibrium repo price, ~p
 
st 1

, adjusts
with the size of the haircut so that resources obtained through the repo market remain unchanged.
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The assumption that interbank (repo) borrowing is collateralized, ~bj (st 1)  b (st 1), is
motivated by a debt enforcement problem à la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Namely, lenders
in the interbank market cannot force borrowers to repay debts, unless these debts are secured
by collateral.
Our model is consistent with evidence that repos are an important margin of balance
sheet adjustment by intermediaries (Adrian and Shin (2010)) and that repo lending allows
participants to "hedge against market risk exposures arising from other activities" (Finan-
cial Stability Board (2012)). In our model, the redistribution of resources using the repo
market is socially benecial as it allows nancial intermediaries to change their risk expo-
sure in response to new information on the productivity of their investments. Resources are
reallocated towards intermediaries who are expected to be more productive, and who lower
their holdings of bonds to invest additional resources in their risky projects. Resources ow
towards the high-risk intermediaries in an expansion and towards the low-risk intermediaries
in a contraction.
While repo borrowing is benecial, it also enables intermediaries to take advantage of
their limited liability and overinvest in risky projects. Intermediariesability to increase risky
investments is limited by their bond holdings. Higher purchases of bonds make balance sheets
seem safer initially, but may lead to increased risk taking through the repo market.
Although intermediaries start out as identical each period, the funds they receive from
households vary with the aggregate state, allowing the model to capture interesting dynamics
over time such as sustained high levels of investment into high-risk projects.
Labor Demand and Production
Once the aggregate shock, st 2 fs; sg, is realized, nancial intermediaries choose labor
demand, lj (st), to equate the wage rate, Wj (st), with the marginal product of labor,
(1     ) qj (st) [kj (st 1)] [lj (st)]  . Production takes places using capital, kj (st 1),
chosen at the second stage portfolio decision and labor, lj (st). Finally, returns to assets are
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paid and bankruptcy may occur.
We note that labor is an essential input into production. If we abstract from labor, then
expected returns to nancial sector equity in our model are larger than expected returns to
deposits, pushing households to choose zero deposits, which is counterfactual. We assume
the labor input is chosen after the intermediaries know j and st, for computational simplicity.
2.2 Nonnancial sector
There is a measure m of identical nonnancial rms funded entirely through household
equity. Each nonnancial rm enters period t with equity M (st 1) =m from households
which is invested into capital. Hence, km (st 1) = M (st 1) =m: Equity returns depend
on the productivity of the production technology in the nonnancial sector, qm (st) which
satises: qh (s)  qm (s) > ql (s)  ql (s) > qm (s) > qh (s).
The problem of a nonnancial rm is to choose capital and labour to solve:
max

ym
 
st

+ qm (st) (1  ) km
 
st 1
 Rm  st km  st 1 Wm  st lm  st	
subject to: ym
 
st

= qm (st)

km
 
st 1
 
lm
 
st
1 
where Rm (st) is the return to capital (equity) invested in the nonnancial sector, lm (st) is
the labor employed in the nonnancial sector and Wm (st) is the wage rate.
The nonnancial sector is introduced to allow our model to be consistent with U.S. data
showing a high equity to deposit ratio for households, a low equity to deposit ratio in the
nancial sector and to match the relative importance of the two sectors in U.S. production.
2.3 Households
There is a measure one of identical households, who maximize expected utility subject to
a budget constraint which equates current wealth, w (st), to expenditures on consumption,
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C (st), and investments that will pay returns next period.
max
1X
t=0
X
st
t'
 
st

logC
 
st

subject to: w
 
st

= Rd
 
st 1

Dh
 
st 1

+Rz
 
st

Z
 
st 1

+Rm
 
st

M
 
st 1

+mWm
 
st

+ (1  m) lWl
 
st

+ (1  m)hWh
 
st

+ T
 
st

w
 
st

= C
 
st

+M
 
st

+Dh
 
st

+ Z
 
st

Here,  is the discount factor and ' (st) is the probability of history st.
At the beginning of period t; the aggregate state st is revealed and household wealth
comprised of returns on previous period investments, wage income and lump-sum taxes
(T (st) < 0) or transfers (T (st)  0) from the government is realized.
Investments take the form of deposits, nancial sector equity, and nonnancial sector
equity. Deposits, Dh (st 1), earn a xed return, Rd (st 1), which is guaranteed by deposit
insurance. Equity invested in the nancial sector, Z (st 1), is a risky investment which
gives households a state-contingent claim to the prots of the intermediaries. The return
per unit of equity is Rz (st) = 1
z(st 1)
P
j2fh;lg jVj (s
t). Similarly, the equity invested in
the nonnancial sector, M (st 1), receives a state-contingent return, Rm (st). An inte-
rior solution in which households invest in all three assets requires that expected returns
to deposits and equity are equalized. Formally,
P
st+1jst
t+1'(st+1)
C(st+1)

Rz (st+1) Rd (st) =P
st+1jst
t+1'(st+1)
C(st+1)
[Rz (st+1) Rm (st+1)] = 0:
Each household supplies one unit of labour inelastically. We assume that labour markets
are segmented. Fraction m of a households time is spent working in the nonnancial
sector, and fraction 1   m is spent in the nancial sector. Within the nancial sector, a
households time is split between high-risk and low-risk intermediaries according to shares
j; where h + l = 1: Given that there are measure one of households and measure one of
rms, labour supplied to each rm is one unit, for any realization of the aggregate state.
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2.4 Government
The government issues bonds that nancial intermediaries hold as an investment or use as
a medium of exchange on the repo market.17 At the end of period t   1; the government
sells bonds, B (st 1), at price, p (st 1) and deposits the proceeds with nancial intermedi-
aries.18 Each nancial intermediary purchases risk-free assets b (st 1) = B (st 1) = (1  m)
and receivesDg (st 1) = (1  m) of government deposits, whereDg (st 1) = p (st 1)B (st 1) :
To guarantee the xed return on deposits the government provides deposit insurance at
zero price which is nanced through household taxation.19 The government balances its
budget after the production takes place at the beginning of period t:20
T
 
st

+B
 
st 1

+ 
 
st

= Rd
 
st 1

Dg
 
st 1

Here,  (st) is the amount of deposit insurance necessary to guarantee the xed return
on deposits, Rd (st 1). Given the limited liability of intermediaries, if they are unable to pay
Rd (st 1) on deposits, they pay a smaller return on deposits which ensures they break-even.
The rest is covered by deposit insurance.
2.5 Market clearing
The labour market clearing conditions state that labour demanded by nancial interme-
diaries and nonnancial rms equals labour supplied by households: mlm (st) = m and
(1  m) jlj (st) = (1  m) j for each j 2 fh; lg. This implies lm (st) = lh (st) = ll (st) = 1:
17This model focuses on the role that government bonds provide as collateral in the repo market. We
abstract from the tax smoothing role of government debt.
18Alternatively, the proceeds from the bond sales could be transferred to households.
19Pennacchi (2006, pg. 14) documents that, since 1996 and prior to the crisis, deposit insurance has been
essentially free for U.S. banks. In our model, the assumption of a zero price of deposit insurance is not
crucial. What matters is that the insurance is not priced in a way to eliminate moral hazard. This means,
for example, that deposit insurance can not be contingent on the portfolio decisions of the intermediaries.
20We concentrate on new issuance of (one period) bonds and abstract from outstanding bonds for com-
putational reasons. Considering the valuation e¤ects of interest rate policy in the presence of outstanding
bonds may be an interesting extension of the model.
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The goods market clearing condition equates total output produced with aggregate con-
sumption and investment. Output produced by nonnancial rms is mqm (st) (km (st 1))
,
while output produced by nancial rms is (1  m)
P
j2fl;hg jqj (s
t) [kj (s
t 1)], where
kj (s
t 1) are resources allocated to the risky projects after repo market trading.
C
 
st

+M
 
st

+Dh
 
st

+ Z
 
st

= (1  m)
X
j2fl;hg
jqj (st)
n
kj
 
st 1

+ (1  ) kj
 
st 1
o
+mqm (st)
h
km
 
st 1

+ (1  ) km
 
st 1
i
There are four nancial market clearing conditions. Deposits demanded by interme-
diaries equal deposits from the households and the government: Dh (st 1) + Dg (st 1) =
D (st 1) = (1  m) d (st 1) : In the bond market, total bond sales by the government
equal the bond purchases by nancial intermediaries: B (st 1) = (1  m) b (st 1) : In the
interbank repo market, trades between the di¤erent types of intermediaries must balance:P
j2fl;hg j~bj (s
t 1) = 0. Lastly, total equity invested by households in the nancial and
nonnancial sectors are distributed over the rms: M (st 1) = mkm (st 1) and Z (st 1) =
(1  m) z (st 1) :
2.6 Government Optimal Policy
The main policy instrument is the price of government bonds. The government chooses the
bond price, p (st 1), or alternatively the bond return, 1=p (st 1), that maximizes the welfare
of the households in the decentralized economy given in problem (P3). The government
satises any demand for bonds given this price.
p
 
st 1

= arg max
p(st 1)
1X
t=0
X
st
t'
 
st

logC
 
st

(P3)
subject to: C
 
st

is part of a competitive equilibrium given policy p
 
st 1

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2.7 Social Planner Problem
We consider a social planners problem as a reference point for our decentralized economy.
To make the social planners environment comparable to the decentralized one, we maintain
the timing assumption. In a slight abuse of language, we refer to the technologies available
to the social planner as belonging to nancial and nonnancial sectors.
At the beginning of period t; the aggregate state, st, is revealed and production takes
place using capital that the social planner has allocated to the di¤erent technologies of
production: km (st 1) for the nonnancial sector, kh (st 1) and kl (st 1) for the high-risk and
low-risk technologies of the nancial sector. Output is then split between consumption and
capital to be used in production at t+1. At the time of this decision, the social planner does
not distinguish between the high-risk and low-risk technologies of the nancial sector used
in production next period, and simply allocates resources, kb (st), to both of them. Once
their type is revealed, the social planner reallocates resources between the two technologies.
The social planner solves:
maxE
1X
t=0
t logC
 
st

subject to:
C
 
st

+ mkm
 
st

+ (1  m) kb
 
st

= mqm (st)
h 
km
 
st 1

+ (1  ) km
 
st 1
i
+ (1  m)lql (st)
h 
kl
 
st 1

+ (1  )  kl  st 1i
+ (1  m)hqh (st)
h 
kh
 
st 1

+ (1  ) kh
 
st 1
i
kl
 
st

= kb
 
st
  h
l
n
 
st

kh
 
st

= kb
 
st

+ n
 
st

where n (st) is the amount of resources given to (or taken from) each high-risk production
technology. To achieve this reallocation, h
l
n (st) resources need to be taken away from (or
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given to) each low-risk technology.
From a social planners perspective, it is optimal for resources to ow to high-risk inter-
mediaries during expansion periods and to low-risk intermediaries during contractions. To
induce these reallocation ows in the decentralized economy, bond prices, p (st), need to be
appropriately chosen by the monetary authority.
2.8 Measurement of Risk Taking
We use our model to assess whether and how interest rate policy inuences risk taking of
intermediaries. To this end, we make our notion of risk taking precise. We dene risk taking
as the percentage deviation in resources invested in the high-risk projects in a competitive
equilibrium relative to the social planner. Formally,
r
 
st 1

=
kCEh (s
t 1)  kSPh (st 1)
kSPh (s
t 1)
 100 (3)
where kCEh (s
t 1) is the capital invested in high-risk projects in the competitive equilibrium
for a given interest rate policy and kSPh (s
t) is the capital the social planner invests in the
high-risk technology.
If the social planners allocation can be implemented with a competitive equilibrium,
the value of r (st 1) in equation (3) is zero. Otherwise, a positive value of r (st 1) tells us
that there is excessive risk taking in the competitive equilibrium, while a negative value
indicates too little risk taking. We dene an aggregate measure of risk taking, averaged over
expansions and contractions, as r  E [r (st 1)].
Alternatively, the risk taking measure in equation (3) can be dened as the percentage
deviation in the share of resources invested in high-risk projects in a competitive equilibrium
relative to the social planner. This entails replacing kih (s
t 1) for i 2 fCE; SPg in equation
(3) with
kih(st 1)
ki(st 1) , where k
i (st 1) represents the total capital in environment i 2 fCE; SPg.
The advantage of this alternative measure is that it takes into account any potential dif-
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ferences between the total capital stocks in the two environments. We nd that the two
measures yield similar quantitative predictions (see footnotes 29 and 31 in Section 4:2). For
this reason, the results we report use the risk taking measure as dened in equation (3).
3 Competitive Equilibrium Properties
First, we present results which relate equilibrium bond prices and the return to deposits. In
Section 3:2, we discuss additional results based on a simplied version of our model.
3.1 Bond Prices and the Return to Deposits
We introduce some useful language to help describe equilibrium properties of our model. We
refer to the repo market as being unconstrained, if for a given history of shocks, st, and policy,
p (st), all nancial intermediaries choose to pledge only a fraction of bonds as collateral in
the repo market, i.e. ~bj (st) < b (st), while keeping the remainder on their balance sheet. A
constrained repo market is one in which either high-risk or low-risk intermediaries have a
binding collateral constraint, i.e. ~bj (st) = b (st) for some j and the Lagrange multipliers on
these constraints are strictly positive. In this case, either high-risk or low-risk intermediaries
have zero bonds on their balance sheet after the repo trades take place.
Proposition 1 relates equilibrium bond prices and the return to deposits, derived in the
full model introduced in Section 2.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium bond prices and the return to deposits satisfy: p (st 1) = ~p (st 1)
and Rd (st 1)  1
p(st 1) . The last inequality is strict in the case of a constrained repo market.
Proof. These results follow from the rst order conditions of the nancial intermediaries
problems. Appendix A.1 outlines the proof.
Proposition 1 formalizes the intuitive result that bond prices and repo prices are equal,
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since there are no regulatory constraints in the model.21 In addition, returns to deposits are
weakly greater than returns to bonds, since otherwise there would be a prot opportunity.
Namely, an intermediary would have incentives to pay a slightly higher deposit return to
attract additional deposits and be able to invest more into bonds. The result Rd (st 1) 
1
p(st 1) can also be interpreted in terms of the option value provided by bonds to intermediaries
(beyond their asset return) because they can be retraded on the repo market. Whenever
some intermediaries are constrained by the amount of collateral they hold, bonds trade at
a discount: Rd (st 1) > 1
p(st 1) : However, if both high-risk and low-risk intermediaries have
su¢ cient bonds, then Rd (st 1) = 1
p(st 1) , since the option value of bonds is zero.
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Proposition 1 is important for two reasons. First, it shows that interest rate policy has a
direct e¤ect on the repo market. The close relationship between the policy rate, 1=p (st 1),
and the repo rate, 1=~p (st 1), is supported by U.S. evidence, as shown in Bech, Klee, and
Stebunovs (2012). Second, the return to depositors is bounded below by the interest rate
on government bonds. Thus, the interest rate policy not only a¤ects the choices nancial
intermediaries make, but also a¤ects the investment choices of households.
3.2 Analytical Results from a Simplied Version of the Model
In this section, we consider a special case of our full model from Section 2 to gain intuition
about the qualitative trade-o¤s implied by the portfolio and collateral channels in regard to
the equilibrium behavior of risk taking. We make simplifying assumptions which allow us to
derive analytical results, at the cost of losing some of the rich dynamics of the full model.
Assumptions A1 : (i) The aggregate productivity shock, st, is i.i.d. The probability of the
21Introducing a capital regulation constraint, for example, would generate a wedge between the equilibrium
bond price and the repo price.
22The result Rd
 
st 1
  1p(st 1) also has a liquidity interpretation à la Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2012). In our model, bonds can be viewed as being more liquid compared to deposits, since
bonds can be converted into risky assets in the interbank market, whereas deposits are only available at the
rst stage of the portfolio choice. If bonds are scarce (i.e. collateral constraint binds), intermediaries assign
a high value to the liquidity attributes of bonds. As a result, the return to bonds is strictly lower than the
return to deposits. If the supply of bonds is plentiful, the liquidity value of bonds is zero.
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good aggregate state, s, is  and the probability of the bad aggregate state, s, is 1 :
(ii) Households are risk neutral. (iii) There is full depreciation,  = 1, and (iv) there
is no nonnancial sector, m = 0:
It is easy to show that, under assumptions A1, the optimal investments into the high-
risk and low-risk technologies do not vary with the aggregate state. The social planner
allocates kSPj = f  [qj (s) + (1  ) qj (s)]g
1
1  ; for j 2 fh; lg, for any time period. This
result follows immediately from the equalization of the expected marginal products of capital
across the di¤erent technologies of production.
We summarize the competitive equilibrium predictions for risk taking in our simplied
model in two propositions. Proposition 2 derives conditions under which the social optimum
can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium and provides intuition for why our full cali-
brated model is not e¢ cient (as discussed further in Section 4.2). Proposition 3 characterizes
the risk taking behavior of intermediaries when the competitive equilibrium is not e¢ cient.
Proposition 2 Under assumptions A1, the interest rate policy 1=p = 1= implements the
social planners allocation as a competitive equilibrium. The competitive equilibrium features
either (i) a repo market in which either high-risk or low-risk intermediaries pledge all their
bond holdings as collateral, no bankruptcy and zero household deposits into nancial inter-
mediaries (only equity investments) or (ii) an unconstrained repo market, no bankruptcy and
equity from households which satises: z  k

1  +

 1

qh(s)
qh(s)
+1 

.
Proof. Available in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 2 shows that whenever equity is su¢ ciently high to guarantee that no bank-
ruptcy occurs in equilibrium, the competitive equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient. The intuition
behind this result is that, with enough equity, the moral hazard problem of nancial inter-
mediaries is reduced and intermediaries do not go bankrupt, as most of their liabilities are
state-contingent. We note that when we calibrate our full model from Section 2 to the U.S.
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economy, the equilibrium household equity under the optimal interest rate policy is not high
enough to implement the social optimum (see Section 4:2).
Proposition 3 establishes results on the intermediaries risk taking behavior when the
competitive equilibrium is not e¢ cient and features bankruptcy. We focus on the case
when the collateral constraint of intermediaries binds, since this is the relevant case for the
numerical simulations of our full model (see Section 4:2).
Proposition 3 Under assumptions A1, in an equilibrium with a constrained repo market,
(i) during a good aggregate state (st = s), lower policy interest rates lead to a reduction in
risk taking, as dened in equation (3) ; while (ii) during a bad aggregate state (st = s), lower
policy interest rates lead to an increase in risk taking, as dened in equation (3).
Proof. Available in Appendix A.1.
The results of Proposition 3 can be interpreted in terms of the portfolio and the collateral
risk taking channels of monetary policy. Purchases of bonds are positively related to bond
returns, which means that, at low interest rates, all intermediaries invest more capital into
risky projects during the rst stage of the portfolio decision (portfolio channel). However,
the amount of risk taking assumed by nancial intermediaries also depends on the volume
of interbank market transactions (collateral channel). The e¤ect of lower bond returns on
repo market activity di¤ers depending on the aggregate state of the economy.
When the repo market is constrained, the portfolio reallocation between intermediaries
is restricted due to scarce collateral (i.e. fewer bonds purchased in the bond market at
low interest rates). During an expansion, high-risk intermediaries would like to invest more
in high-risk projects, but they are constrained from borrowing more. Lower policy rates
lead to lower investments in risky capital in the competitive equilibrium, i.e. @k
CE
h
@(1=p)
> 0,
and a reduction in risk taking as dened in equation (3), since kSPh is xed (i.e. k
SP
h =
f  [qh (s) + (1  ) qh (s)]g
1
1  ). By the same token, during a contraction, fewer resources
are reallocated from the high-risk to the low-risk intermediaries, and there is an increase in
risk taking.
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One main insight from the analytical results is that if equity of nancial intermediaries
is su¢ ciently high, the competitive equilibrium is e¢ cient. This result no longer holds when
equity is relatively low, consistent with U.S. data. In this case, the equilibrium features
either excessive or insu¢ cient risk taking, depending on the level of interest rates.
When we calibrate our full model from Section 2 to the U.S. economy, we nd results
similar to those of Proposition 3. However, the mechanism through which lower interest rates
reduce (increase) risk taking during periods of good (bad) aggregate shocks di¤ers slightly.
When the aggregate shock is persistent, conditional on boom periods, there is a negative
correlation between the interest rate (1=p) and the investments in high-risk capital in the
competitive equilibrium (kCEh ). This result is consistent with the empirical literature showing
that when interest rates are low intermediaries take on more risk. As discussed, the simple
analytical model is not able to capture this result, illustrating why it is necessary to analyze
the full model. In our full model, as the interest rate declines during persistent periods of
good times, both kCEh and k
SP
h rise. Numerical results of our full model are necessary to
shed light on whether the risk taking behavior in this environment is excessive.
4 Quantitative Analysis
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and solve it numerically to evaluate its quanti-
tative predictions for risk taking. We calibrate the following parameters: ; ; the aggregate
shock transition matrix, , and h. The remaining parameters, m; ; ; qh (s) ; qh (s) ;
qm (s) ; qm (s) ; ql (s) ; ql (s), are determined jointly using a minimum distance estimator.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the parameter values.
We identify our models total output with the U.S. business sector value added and our
models nonnancial sector with the U.S. corporate nonnancial sector.23 Unless otherwise
23We treat the remainder of the U.S. business sector (the corporate nancial and the noncorporate busi-
23
noted, we use U.S. quarterly data from the BEA and the Flow of Funds for the period
1987Q1 to 2015Q2 when ination was low and stable.
We choose the discount factor, , to ensure an annual real interest rate of 4 percent in our
quarterly model. We set  to match an average capital income share for the U.S. business
sector of 0:29 from 1948 to 2014. To calibrate the transition matrix for the aggregate state,
we use the Harding and Pagan (2002) approach of identifying peaks and troughs in real value
added of the U.S. business sector from 1947Q1 to 2015Q2.24 Using information on the number
of contractions and expansions and their average duration, we calculate: (i) the probability
of switching from a contraction to an expansion,  (st = sjst 1 = s) = 0:256, and (ii) the
probability of switching from an expansion to a contraction,  (st = sjst 1 = s) = 0:05:
The share of nancial intermediaries with high-risk projects, h, is more di¢ cult to
determine. The models idiosyncratic shock which determines the type of risky projects
intermediaries invest in is assumed to be i.i.d. to retain tractability of the model. The
motivation behind the i.i.d. assumption is that the subset of U.S. nancial intermediaries who
are considered the most risky changes considerably over time. In the context of the recent
nancial crisis, one can think of brokers and dealers as a proxy for high-risk intermediaries,
although the widespread use of o¤-balance sheet activities among other institutions suggests
that this denition may be too narrow.
To determine h; we use U.S. Flow of Funds data which shows that nancial assets
of brokers and dealers were, on average, 5 percent of the nancial assets of all nancial
institutions and 21 percent of the nancial assets of depository institutions.25 We set h
between these two estimates and perform sensitivity analysis with respect to this value.
We determine the remaining parameters the importance of the nonnancial sector, m,
nesses) as the models nancial intermediation sector. In U.S. data, noncorporate businesses are strongly
dependent on the nancial sector for funding. In the past three decades, bank loans and mortgages were 60
to 80 percent of noncorporate businessesliabilities. For simplicity, we do not model these loans, and assume
that the nancial intermediary is endowed with the technology of production of noncorporate businesses.
24The business cycles we identify closely mimic those determined by the NBER.
25The 21 percent average masks large variations, ranging from 8:6 percent in 1987Q1 to 35 percent in
2007Q2 and down to 15:6 percent in 2015Q2.
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the xed factor in the production function of the nancial sector, , the depreciation rate,
, and the productivity parameters, qh (s) ; qm (s) ; qm (s) ; ql (s) ; ql (s) jointly using a min-
imum distance estimator to match eight U.S. data moments described below. We normalize
the productivity of the high-risk intermediary in the good aggregate state, qh (s) = 1, since
the absolute level of productivity is not important in our model.
Let 
i be a model moment and let ~
i be the corresponding data moment. We choose
the set of parameters Q to solve problem (P4) below, where the optimal bond price, p, is
the solution to problem (P3) shown in Section 2:6 and where the productivity parameters
are ordered across the di¤erent technology types as discussed in the model section.26
Q = arg min
Q=fqm(s);qm(s);ql(s);
ql(s);qh(s);;;mg
8X
i=1
 

i   ~
i
~
i
!2
(P4)
s.t. : qh (s) < qm (s) < ql (s)  ql (s) < qm (s)  qh (s) and

i is implied in a competitive equilibrium given policy p
The eight data moments that we target are: (i) the average value added share for the
corporate nonnancial sector, (ii) the average equity to total asset ratio for corporate nan-
cial businesses, (iii) the average capital depreciation rate, (iv) the average peak-to-trough
decline in business sector real value added, (v) the coe¢ cient of variation of business sector
value added, (vi) the coe¢ cient of variation of household net worth, (vii) the average ratio
of household deposits to total nancial assets and (viii) the recovery rate during bankruptcy.
We note that the average peak-to-trough decline in business sector real value added is taken
across all contraction periods since 1947Q1: Moreover, the recovery rate during bankruptcy
is from Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2003), who show the average recovery rate on
corporate bonds in the United States during 1982 to 1999 was 42 cents on the dollar.
26Given an initial set of parameter values, call it Q1, and an initial guess for our competitive equilibrium
allocation, we nd the optimal bond price, p1, using problem (P3). Then, given p

1, we nd parameters Q

2
which solve problem (P4) : We continue this iterative process until convergence is achieved. We choose this
two-step procedure because our model is highly nonlinear and the initial guess is very important in nding
a competitive equilibrium solution. The initial guess we start with is the social planners allocation.
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Table 2 shows that the model matches the data moments well. The rst three data
moments help pin down m,  and , respectively. We chose moment (ii) since the parameter
 inuences the returns to equity in our models nancial sector, which, in turn, depend on
the equity to total assets ratio of intermediaries. We also note that  is chosen so that our
models stochastic depreciation rate,
mqm;tkm;t+(1 m)(hqh;tkh;t+lql;tkl;t)
mkm;t+(1 m)(hkh;t+lkl;t)
, matches the data.
The remaining moments help pin down productivity parameters.
The productivity parameters estimated (see Table 2) show that low-risk projects are
virtually riskless, while high-risk projects have a large variance of returns. This suggests the
moral hazard problem is important for high-risk intermediaries.
4.2 Simulation Results
In this section, we present simulation results from our competitive equilibrium and contrast
them with the social optimum. We discuss why the social optimum is not implementable
in our calibrated model, and then solve for the optimal interest rate policy. Moreover, we
consider upward and downward shifts in the interest rate schedule, to evaluate risk taking
behavior when interest rates are either lower or higher than optimal.
The simplied version of our model in Section 3:2 illustrated that when equity is su¢ -
ciently high, the moral hazard of nancial intermediaries is reduced, there is no bankruptcy,
and the competitive equilibrium is e¢ cient (see Proposition 2). However, the social planner
allocation can no longer be implemented as a competitive equilibrium when our full model
is calibrated to match the average U.S. equity to asset ratio of nancial intermediaries of
about 23%. Indeed, implementing the social planner allocation as a competitive equilibrium
in our calibrated model would require that, in a bad aggregate state, the returns to deposits
and bonds satisfy: Rd < 1=p; which violates the result of Proposition 1.27 The interpretation
27Implementing the social optimum has two implications for competitive equilibrium returns. First, in
a bad aggregate state, it is optimal to shift resources from high-risk to low-risk intermediaries, who are
expected to be relatively more productive. To provide incentives for high-risk intermediaries to buy a large
value of bonds in the interbank market, bond returns need to be su¢ ciently high (or bond prices need to
be su¢ ciently low) in a bad aggregate state. Second, returns to deposits need to be relatively low so that
26
of our nding is that interest rate policy alone cannot eliminate the moral hazard problem
of the high-risk nancial intermediaries.
Given that the social planner allocation is not implementable, we solve for the optimal
bond price, p (st 1), that maximizes the welfare of the representative consumer, i.e. the
price which solves problem (P3). Moreover, we consider uniform upward or downward shifts
in the interest rate schedule relative to the optimal policy to assess how the competitive
equilibrium changes in environments with higher or lower than optimal interest rates. In
all these experiments, we use two metrics to compare the competitive equilibrium results
to the social planner allocation. First, we use the risk taking measure dened in Section
2.8 to determine whether a particular interest rate policy implies too much or too little risk
taking relative to the social planner. Second, we consider a standard welfare measure, the
lifetime consumption equivalent (LTCE), dened as the percentage decrease in the optimal
consumption from the planners allocation required to give the consumer the same welfare
as the consumption from the competitive equilibrium with a given interest rate policy.
We employ a collocation method with occasionally binding non-linear constraints to solve
our model, due to the limited liability of nancial intermediaries and the possibility of a
constrained repo market (for details, see Appendix A:2).
Experiment 1: Optimal interest rate policy, [p (st 1)] 1 : We optimize over the
bond price policy function numerically, as shown in problem (P3). We nd that when the
interest rate policy is chosen optimally, the competitive equilibrium has a constrained repo
market and features bankruptcy of high-risk intermediaries. The collateral constraint binds
for high-risk intermediaries during periods of good aggregate shocks (st = s), and for low-
risk intermediaries during periods of bad aggregate shocks (st = s). The intuition is that
optimal policy aims to restrict risk taking of nancial intermediaries, who otherwise may
take advantage of their limited liability and overinvest in risky projects. An e¤ective way to
restrict risk taking and potential bankruptcy losses is to limit the amount of bonds, so that
intermediaries can pay back depositors. In combination, returns would have to satisfy Rd < 1=p.
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collateral for future trading in the repo market is scarce.
Figure 2 presents simulation results from the competitive equilibrium and the social
planners problem, for a sequence of one hundred draws of the aggregate shock. We nd
that the optimal interest rate policy is procyclical. The intuition is as follows. Returns
to bonds are linked to returns to deposits (recall Proposition 1), which in turn are linked
to expected returns to equity through non-arbitrage conditions. Low returns to bonds in
contractions allow returns to deposits to be low and ensure that potential bankruptcy costs
are minimized.28 In addition, whenever returns to bonds are low, the supply of government
bonds is also low (see second row of subplots in Figure 2). As a result, the equilibrium value
of government bonds, pB, falls, which reduces the value of collateral that can be used to
borrow in contractions.
The third row of subplots in Figure 2 shows there is excessive risk taking in the com-
petitive equilibrium, as more resources are invested in high-risk projects compared to the
amount allocated by the social planner. During periods with good realizations of the aggre-
gate state, the value of collateral is high and resources in the repo market are reallocated
from the low-risk to the high-risk projects, which are expected to be more productive. Risk
taking in contractions is lower than in expansions, but is still in excess of the social plan-
ner optimum. In contractions, a lower collateral value limits the reallocation of resources
from high-risk to low-risk projects, leaving high-risk intermediaries with higher than optimal
investment in risky projects.
Figure 2 also shows that output produced in the competitive equilibrium is higher relative
to the social optimum, because more resources are invested in productive high-risk projects.
However, the consumption paths in the two environments track each other closely.
Lastly, as the optimal interest rate policy, 1=p, declines during extended periods of good
28The average di¤erence between the return to deposits, Rd, and the return to bonds, 1=p, in our ex-
periment with optimal interest rate policy is 200 basis points per year. As argued in footnote 22, some
of this di¤erence can be assigned to the liquidity attributes of bonds in our model, in line with Krishna-
murthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). These authors nd that the U.S. Treasury convenience yield (i.e. the
value assigned to the liquidity and safety attributes of Treasuries) is 73 basis points per year for the period
1926  2008.
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aggregate shocks, the resources allocated to high-risk investments in the competitive equi-
librium, kCEh , increase (see Figure 2). In all our simulations, conditional on boom periods,
the correlation between the interest rate policy and high-risk investments is negative, consis-
tent with ndings of the empirical literature (for paper references see footnote 1). However,
during persistent periods of good aggregate shocks the optimal amount of resources that are
allocated to high-risk projects
 
kSPh

also increases. This suggests that not all of the increase
in kCEh is suboptimal.
To measure welfare losses and risk taking in our competitive equilibrium relative to the
social planner, we average over the results of 500 simulations of 750 periods each. Table 3
shows that, at the optimal interest rate policy, investments in high-risk projects are about 5
percent higher, on average, in the competitive equilibrium relative to the social optimum.29
The average is taken over expansion and contraction periods. The excessive risk taking leads
to a small welfare loss of 0:0188% in LTCE.30
Our model has other interesting implications. First, repo market reallocation is bene-
cial, as it brings the economy closer to the social optimum. Shutting down the interbank
repo market in the competitive equilibrium reduces welfare relative to the social planner
by an amount equivalent to lowering consumption throughout the lifetime by about 1 per-
cent. Second, government seigniorage from bond issuance, i.e. Rd (st 1)Dg (st 1) B (st 1),
is always positive. Specically, using Dg (st 1) = p (st 1)B (st 1), seigniorage becomes
Rd (st 1) p (st 1)  1  B (st 1), which is always positive in a model with a constrained
repo market because Rd (st 1) > 1=p (st 1), as shown in Proposition 1. In good times, when
there is no bankruptcy and deposit insurance in zero, all the seigniorage revenue is trans-
29As mentioned in section 2.8, instead of comparing the level of investments in high-risk projects 
i.e. kCEh and k
SP
h

to gauge the amount of risk taking see equation (3) one could compare investments
in high-risk projects as a share of the total capital stock
 
i.e. kCEh =k
CE and kSPh =k
SP

. Under this alterna-
tive measure of risk taking, we obtain the same qualitative result that the competitive equilibrium features
excessive risk taking at the optimal interest rate policy. Quantitatively, the amount of excessive risk taking
is slightly lower than under our benchmark measure of risk taking dened in equation (3). Namely, at the
optimal interest rate policy, the share of investments in high-risk projects is about 3:8 percent higher, on
average, in the competitive equilibrium relative to the social optimum.
30Augmenting the model with a capital regulation constraint (as in Basel II) delivers similar results.
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ferred to households. In bad times, seigniorage revenue covers a part of deposit insurance,
while the rest is covered via lump-sum household taxation. Numerically, at the optimal in-
terest rate, seigniorage is, on average, 0:27 percent of average household consumption, while
household transfers are, on average,  0:36 percent of average household consumption.
Experiment 2: Level shifts in the optimal interest rate policy. We consider uniform
shifts in the bond returns schedule: [p (st 1)] 1   , where p () is the optimal bond price
and  is a constant, say 0:5 percentage points. In all of these experiments, the equilibrium
also features a constrained repo market. Results from these alternate policies are presented
in Figures 3 and 4.
Figure 3 compares risk taking and welfare results from a wide range of experiments with
di¤erent values of  with results from Experiment 1. Similar to the results displayed in Table
3, the welfare and risk taking in Figure 3 are averages over 500 simulations of 750 periods
each. In both subplots, the x-axis shows deviations from the optimal equilibrium policy,
[p (st 1)] 1 ranging from  2 to +2 percentage points at annual rates. The zero mark on
the x-axis shows results for Experiment 1, where policy is optimally chosen. We nd that
small deviations from the optimal policy, say 50 basis points, entail relatively small welfare
losses, but sizable changes in risk taking. Higher than optimal bond returns lead to more risk
taking relative to the optimum, while lower than optimal bond returns lead to reductions in
risk taking (also see Table 3).31
Whenever interest rates are su¢ ciently below the optimum, there is too little risk taking
in the competitive equilibrium relative to the optimum, r  E [r (st 1)] < 0 (see Figure
3). Here is the intuition for this result. At low interest rates, intermediaries purchase fewer
government bonds (the portfolio channel). When aggregate productivity is expected to be
high, high-risk intermediaries would like to invest more in their risky projects. However, a low
31The qualitative risk taking results are identical if the risk taking measure is alternatively dened in
terms of the share of high-risk investments in total capital
 
i.e. by comparing kCEh =k
CE and kSPh =k
SP

as
discussed in Section 2:8. The quantitative results are only slightly di¤erent and, for this reason, are not
reported. Also, see footnote 29.
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quantity and a low value of collateral constrain their portfolio adjustment in the interbank
market (the collateral channel). Quantitatively, the collateral channel dominates. Thus,
during expansion periods, whenever interest rates are su¢ ciently low, investments in high-
risk projects in the competitive equilibrium are lower than the social planner optimum (see
Figure 4 for simulation of optimal policy minus 50 basis points at annual rate). Conversely,
during contractions, risk taking is in excess of the social optimum. Our model is calibrated
to be consistent with the fact that U.S. expansion periods are longer than contractions. As a
result, aggregate risk taking, dened as an average over expansions and contractions in our
simulations, is lower than the social optimum, whenever policy rates are su¢ ciently low.
Higher than optimal interest rates entail larger welfare losses in our environment (Figure
3). At higher interest rates, intermediaries purchase more safe bonds (portfolio channel),
which leads to a relaxation of their collateral constraint and allows for more borrowing in
the interbank market (collateral channel). Our paper makes an important contribution by
highlighting that relaxing collateral constraints increases risk taking with adverse e¤ects for
real activity and welfare. This insight is in contrast to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) where
shocks to credit-constrained rms are amplied and transmitted to output through changes
in collateral values. In their framework, relaxing collateral constraints is benecial.
The nal observation from Figure 3 is that large reductions in bond returns result in a
shutdown of the repo market in good times. This result is similar to Boissay, Collard, and
Smets (2016) who show that su¢ ciently low interest rates lead to interbank market freezes.
In our numerical experiments, deviations of at least 160 basis points below the optimal
policy lead intermediaries to demand no bonds in good times. The portfolio channel is
quantitatively important here, as the collateral channel is eliminated. Even though high-risk
intermediaries invest all resources in risky assets in good times, they are still underinvesting
relative to the social planner. As the bond market shuts down in good times, the households
give slightly more resources to nancial intermediaries. This result generates the kink in the
subplots of Figure 3. To the left of the kink, risk taking is still lower compared to the social
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planner, but less so.
Sensitivity analysis: Share of High-Risk Intermediaries In the numerical results
presented so far, high-risk nancial intermediaries represented 15 percent of all intermedi-
aries (or 5:2 percent of all rms in the economy). We examine how our results on welfare
and risk taking change when high-risk intermediaries are a smaller or bigger fraction of all
intermediaries, i.e. h is 13% or 17%. In both cases, we re-optimize the policy rate.
The results from the sensitivity analysis are reported in Table 4. The quantitative results
change with h: Higher h leads to slightly higher risk taking and slightly larger welfare losses
at the optimal interest rate policy. However, the qualitative result remains the same: lower
than optimal interest rates lead to reductions in risk taking relative to the social planner.
To summarize, we examined a model in which a moral hazard problem enables inter-
mediaries to take on excessive risks at the optimal interest rate policy. To shed light on
recent debates in the literature, we use our framework to examine how the intermediaries
incentives to take on risks are altered by changes in the interest rate policy. A key insight
is that collateralized interbank borrowing acts as a safeguard against increases in risk tak-
ing, especially at low interest rates. Moreover, higher than optimal interest rates lead to a
relaxation of collateral constraints and induce higher risk taking and larger welfare losses
compared to lower than optimal interest rates.
5 Conclusion
The recent nancial crisis has stirred interest in the relationship between lower than optimal
interest rates and the risk taking behavior of nancial institutions. We examine this relation-
ship in a dynamic general equilibrium model that features deposit insurance, limited liability
of nancial intermediaries, and heterogeneity in the riskiness of intermediariesportfolios.
There are two channels through which interest rate policy inuences risk taking in our
model. The portfolio channel illustrates the idea that lower than optimal policy rates reduce
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the returns to safe assets and lead intermediaries to shift investments towards riskier assets.
Given fewer bond purchases in the bond market, intermediaries have less collateral available
for repo market transactions. Hence, the collateral channel constrains the ability of interme-
diaries to take on more risk through the repo market, after they receive further information
regarding the riskiness of their projects. In order to determine the quantitative importance
of the two channels, we calibrate our model to U.S. data and show that, our decentralized
economy with optimal interest rate policy features excessive risk taking and has welfare that
is close to, though below, the social optimum. While both risk taking channels lead to im-
portant changes in the intermediariesportfolios, for reasonably large variations around the
optimal policy, the collateral channel dominates quantitatively. Thus, lower than optimal
interest rates lead to reductions in risk taking relative to the social optimum.
Our results are consistent with the empirical nding that intermediaries take on more risks
when interest rates are low. Expansions in our decentralized economy are characterized by
optimally declining interest rates and feature higher investments in risky projects. However,
the socially optimal amount of investments in risky assets also rises in expansions. This
suggests that, when interest rates are low, some increase in risky investments is optimal and
government policy should not aim to eliminate it.
A response to the nancial crisis has been the global adoption of stricter capital and
leverage regulations aimed to promote nancial sector stability (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2011)). Concurrently, there have been discussions about integrating nancial
stability objectives in monetary policy decision making (Stein (2014), Woodford (2012),
Kocherlakota (2014)). A natural extension of our analysis is to introduce nancial regulation
constraints in the intermediariesproblem. In our current framework, the amount of equity
to risky capital investments and the intermediaries leverage varies with the cycle. It is
therefore straightforward to introduce capital and leverage constraints and to examine the
interaction between monetary policy and nancial regulations in shaping intermediaries
decisions. We have shown that optimal monetary policy alone cannot eliminate the excessive
33
risk taking of nancial intermediaries relative to the social optimum. In Cociuba, Shukayev,
and Ueberfeldt (2015), we show that state contingent capital regulation or state contingent
leverage regulation can be used in conjunction with monetary policy to eliminate excessive
risk taking and achieve the social optimum.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
To simplify notation in our derivations, we use subscript t 1 as short hand notation for the
history, st 1: For example, ~bj;t 1  ~bj (st 1) and bt 1  b (st 1) :
Proof of Proposition 1.
Deriving the relationship between bond prices and the return to deposits in our model
involves analyzing three possible outcomes on the repo market. Transactions of bonds either
satisfy: (i) ~bj;t 1 < bt 1 for both j 2 fh; lg or (ii) ~bh;t 1 = bt 1 and ~bl;t 1 < bt 1 or (iii)
~bl;t 1 = bt 1 and ~bh;t 1 < bt 1: We sketch the proof of Proposition 1 for case (ii). The proof
is obtained in an analogous fashion for cases (i) and (iii) and is omitted here for brevity.32
In case (ii) ; the high-risk intermediary increases the amount of resources allocated to
risky investments by selling all bond holdings in the repo market.
Step 1: Some Key Relationships
In characterizing the equilibrium, it is useful to dene xt 1 as the share of resources a
nancial intermediary retains for risky investment at the rst stage of the portfolio decision.
kt 1 = xt 1 (zt 1 + dt 1) (4)
bt 1 =
1  xt 1
pt 1
(zt 1 + dt 1) (5)
where the second equation was obtained using (4) and equation (1) in the main text.
For case (ii), high-risk intermediaries use all their bonds as collateral in the repo market,
while low-risk intermediaries give resources against this collateral.
~bh;t 1 = bt 1 =
1  xt 1
pt 1
(zt 1 + dt 1) (6)
~bl;t 1 =  h
l
bt 1 =  h
l
1  xt 1
pt 1
(zt 1 + dt 1) (7)
32The full derivation is available upon request from the authors.
38
Using equations (4)  (7) ; the resources allocated to risky investments by high-risk and
low-risk intermediaries after the repo market trades are given by (8) and (9) :
kh;t 1  kt 1 + ~pt 1~bh;t 1 =

xt 1 +
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1) (8)
kl;t 1  kt 1 + ~pt 1~bl;t 1 =

xt 1   h
l
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1) (9)
Step 2: Equilibrium Conditions for the Financial Sector
In what follows, we make use of the equilibrium result lh;t = ll;t = 1.
We rewrite the repo market problem given in (P2) as below:
max~bj;t 1
P
stjst 1 1j;tt
8><>:
qj;t

kt 1 + ~pt 1~bj;t 1

+ (1  )

kt 1 + ~pt 1~bj;t 1

+

bt 1   ~bj;t 1

 Rdt 1dt 1  Wj;t
9>=>;
where ~bj;t 1 2
h
 kt 1
~pt 1
; bt 1
i
and 1j;t is an indicator function which equals 1 if the prots
of intermediaries (the terms in the curly brackets above) are strictly positive, or 0 otherwise.
The rst order conditions with respect to bond trades, ~bh;t 1 and ~bl;t 1; are given by:
X
stjst 1
1j;tt

qj;t~pt 1



kt 1 + ~pt 1~bj;t 1
 1
+ 1  

  1

  j;t 1 = 0 (10)
where j;t 1 for j 2 fh; lg are the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints ~bj;t 1  bt 1 and
they satisfy the complimentary slackness conditions: j;t 1  0; j;t 1

bt 1   ~bj;t 1

= 0:33
For case (ii), l;t 1 = 0 and h;t 1  0: Using this, along with the expressions in (8) and
(9) ; we can rewrite equation (10) for j 2 fh; lg as (11) and (12) below:


xt 1   h
l
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1)
 1
+ 1   =
P
stjst 1 1l;tt
~pt 1
P
stjst 1 1l;ttql;t
(11)


xt 1 +
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1)
 1
+ 1   
P
stjst 1 1h;tt
~pt 1
P
stjst 1 1h;ttqh;t
(12)
33In equilibrium, the constraint  kt 1~pt 1  ~bj;t 1 does not bind as returns to capital invested in risky projects
would become innite.
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Notice that equation (11) can be equivalently written as:

xt 1   h
l
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1) =
"
1

 P
stjst 1 1l;ttP
stjst 1 1l;ttql;t~pt 1
  1 + 
!# 1
 1
(13)
Using equations (4)  (9) we rewrite the bond market problem (P1) as below:
maxxt 12[0;1]
dt 10
P
j2fh;lg j
P
stjst 1 tVj;t
subject to: Vl;t = max
8>>>><>>>>:
266664
ql;t
h
xt 1   hl
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1)
i
+ql;t (1  )

xt 1   hl
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1)
+ 1
l
(1 xt 1)
pt 1
(zt 1 + dt 1) Rdt 1dt 1  Wl;t
377775 ; 0
9>>>>=>>>>;
Vh;t = max
8><>:
264 qh;t
h
xt 1 +
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1)
i
+qh;t (1  )

xt 1 +
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1) Rdt 1dt 1  Wh;t
375 ; 0
9>=>;
The rst order conditions with respect to xt 1 and dt 1 are given by (14) and (15) ;
respectively.34
1
pt 1
X
stjst 1
t1l;t = (14)(


xt 1   h
l
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1)
 1
+ 1  
)
1 +
h
l
~pt 1
pt 1

l
X
stjst 1
1l;ttql;t
+
(


xt 1 +
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1)
 1
+ 1  
)
1  ~pt 1
pt 1

h
X
stjst 1
1h;ttqh;t
Rdt 1
X
j2fh;lg
j
X
stjst 1
1j;tt = (15)(


xt 1   h
l
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1)
 1
+ 1  
)
l
X
stjst 1
1l;ttql;t
+
(


xt 1 +
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1)
 1
+ 1  
)
h
X
stjst 1
1h;ttqh;t
34In order to obtain equation (15) ; we derive the rst order condition with respect to deposits and simplify
it by using equation (14) :
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Step 3: Bond Prices
Using (13) ; the equilibrium condition for the choice of xt 1, equation (14), becomes:

1
pt 1
  l
~pt 1

1 +
h
l
~pt 1
pt 1
 X
stjst 1
1l;tt
=
(


xt 1 +
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1)
 1
+ 1  
)
1  ~pt 1
pt 1

h
X
stjst 1
1h;ttqh;t
Using l + h = 1; the equation above is simplied to:

1  ~pt 1
pt 1

  = 0 (16)
where  


h
xt 1 +
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1)
i 1
+ 1  

h
P
stjst 1 1h;ttqh;t+
+
l
P
stjst 1 1l;tt
~pt 1
: Notice that  > 0; unless all nancial intermediaries go broke. Then,
equation (16) implies that the bond price and the repo price are equated, ~pt 1 = pt 1:
Step 4: Bond Price and Return to Deposits
Next, we subtract equation (15) from equation (14) and nd equation (17) :
1
pt 1
X
stjst 1
1l;tt  Rdt 1
X
j2fh;lg
j
X
stjst 1
1j;tt (17)
=
(


xt 1   h
l
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1)
 1
+ 1  
)
h
~pt 1
pt 1
X
stjst 1
1l;ttql;t
 
(


xt 1 +
~pt 1
pt 1
(1  xt 1)

(zt 1 + dt 1)
 1
+ 1  
)
~pt 1
pt 1
h
X
stjst 1
1h;ttqh;t
Using (11) and (12) ; equation (17) becomes Rdt 1  1pt 1 : This completes the proof of Propo-
sition 1 for the case in which the high-risk intermediary sells all bonds in the repo market.
The other cases are derived analogously, but are omitted here for brevity.
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Proof of Proposition 2.
In the case of an unconstrained repo market ~bj;t 1 < bt 1, and the Lagrange multipliers
on these constraints are j;t 1 = 0 for both j 2 fh; lg : Using equation (10) ; we obtain:
kj;t 1  kt 1 + ~pt 1~bj;t 1 =
"
1

 P
stjst 1 1j;ttP
stjst 1 1j;ttqj;t~pt 1
  1 + 
!# 1
 1
(18)
where, as before, 1j;t is an indicator which equals 0 when intermediaries are bankrupt and
1 otherwise. Under assumptions A1, we know that t =
8><>:  if st = s1   if st = s and  = 1:
Assuming no bankruptcy of nancial intermediaries, i.e. 1j;t = 1, we see from equation (18)
that kj;t 1 = [~pt 1 (qj (s) + (1  ) qj (s))]
1
1  : Using Proposition 1, in an unconstrained
repo market pt 1 = ~pt 1 and Rdt 1 = 1=pt 1: Moreover, under assumptions A1, the Euler
equation in our simplied model is Rdt = 1=. Hence, ~pt 1 =  and resources allocated to
high-risk and low-risk technologies coincide with the social planners allocations: kj;t 1 =
[ (qj (s) + (1  ) qj (s))]
1
1  for j 2 fh; lg :
No intermediary becomes bankrupt if and only if equation (19) holds for all j and all
aggregate states.
qj;t

kt 1 + ~pt 1~bj;t 1

+

bt 1   ~bj;t 1

 Rdt 1dt 1  Wj;t > 0 (19)
Equation (19) simplies to ( + ) qj;t (kj;t 1)
  kj;t 1

+ zt 1

> 0 for all j and all t, where
we used the fact that Wj;t is the marginal product of labor, the expression for bt 1 given in
equation (5) ; the expression for ~bj;t 1 =
kj;t 1 kt 1
~pt 1
from equations (8) and (9), the expression
for kt 1 from equation (4) and the results that pt 1 = ~pt 1 =  and Rdt 1 = 1=pt 1:
To guarantee no intermediary becomes bankrupt, it su¢ ces to check that high-risk inter-
mediaries do not go bankrupt in the bad aggregate state. This is equivalent to
zt 1  kt 1

1  +

 1

qh(s)
qh(s)
+1 

:
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In the case of a constrained repo market, we focus on the situation in which ~bh;t 1 = bt 1
and ~bl;t 1 < bt 1: The proof for the case ~bh;t 1 < bt 1 and ~bl;t 1 = bt 1 is derived analogously.
Interiority of ~bl;t 1 yields, as before, the expression for kl;t 1 given in equation (18) : To
nd kh;t 1 we use equation (15) along with equations (8) and (9), the expression for kl;t 1 in
equation (18) and the assumption  = 1.
kh;t 1 =
0B@ hPstjst 1 1h;ttqh;t
Rdt 1
P
j2fh;lg j
P
stjst 1 1j;tt  
P
stjst 1 1j;ttP
stjst 1 1j;ttqj;t~pt 1
l
P
stjst 1 1l;ttql;t
1CA
1
1 
(20)
Using assumptions A1, the results that pt 1 = ~pt 1 and Rdt = 1=, and given di¤erent
bankruptcy scenarios for intermediaries, we can simplify equations (18) and (20) as below.
kl;t 1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
[pt 1ql (s)]
1
1  if both types go broke when st = s
fpt 1 [ql (s) + (1  ) ql (s)]g
1
1  if only high-risk type goes broke if st = s
fpt 1 [ql (s) + (1  ) ql (s)]g
1
1  if neither type goes broke when st = s
(21)
kh;t 1 =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:

hqh(s)
1

 l 1pt 1
 1
1 
if both types go broke when st = s
hqh(s)
1

(l+h) l 1pt 1
 1
1 
if high-risk type goes broke when st = s
h[qh(s)+(1 )qh(s)]
1

 l 1pt 1
 1
1 
if neither type goes broke when st = s
(22)
If neither type of intermediary is bankrupt in a bad aggregate state (st = s), the interest
rate policy 1
pt 1
= 1

implements the social planners allocation (see equations (21) and (22)).
It can be shown that no nancial intermediary is bankrupt if and only if households invest
only equity into intermediaries (household deposits are zero).
Proof of Proposition 3.
First, we prove result (i). In an equilibrium with a constrained repo market, during a good
aggregate state (st = s), high-risk nancial intermediaries are selling all their bonds in the
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interbank market, i.e. ~bh;t 1 = bt 1. The low-risk nancial intermediaries purchase bonds,
i.e. ~bl;t 1 < 0 < bt 1: Using the expression for kh;t 1 in equation (22), it is easy to show that
lower policy interest rates lead to less high-risk investments in the competitive equilibrium
during good aggregate states, i.e.
@kCEh;t 1
@

1
pt 1
 > 0: Since the social planners allocation, kSPh;t 1
does not change (i.e. kSPh = f  [qh (s) + (1  ) qh (s)]g
1
1  ), lower kCEh also means lower
risk taking during good aggregate states.
The proof for result (ii) is derived analogously. In an equilibrium with a constrained repo
market, during a bad aggregate state (st = s), low-risk nancial intermediaries are selling all
their bonds in the interbank market, i.e. ~bl;t 1 = bt 1. The high-risk nancial intermediaries
purchase bonds, i.e. ~bh;t 1 < 0 < bt 1: An expression for kh;t 1 can be derived in this case
(the analog for equation (22) when ~bl;t 1 = bt 1 and ~bh;t 1 < bt 1). It is then easy to show
that lower interest rates increase risk taking during bad aggregate states,
@kCEh;t 1
@

1
pt 1
 < 0:
A.2 Computation of Equilibrium
We compute a recursive formulation of the model, where the state variables are the aggregate
state, st, and the household wealth, wt. We solve for consumption as a function of the state
variables using a collocation method with linear spline functions. To improve the accuracy
and the speed of the computation, we use an endogenous grid method à la Carroll (2006).
We separate the household problem into two parts: an intertemporal consumption choice
and a portfolio choice. The households portfolio decision involves allocation of resources to
the nonnancial and nancial sectors so that expected returns across sectors are equalized.
Given the overall resources allocated to the nancial sector, the split between equity and
deposits is determined so that expected returns from these two types of investments are
equalized (for details, see Carroll (2012), Section 7 on multiple control variables).
There are two main challenges when solving the nancial sector problem: (i) some -
nancial intermediaries may be constrained in their repo market trades and (ii) nancial
intermediaries may go bankrupt when the aggregate state is realized. We consider all the
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possible combinations in sequence and verify which is an equilibrium. For example, we as-
sume that when the aggregate state switches from good to bad, high risk intermediaries are
constrained in their repo market trade and go bankrupt, while the low risk intermediaries are
unconstrained and do not go bankrupt. After solving the nancial intermediariesproblems,
we check whether the outcome is consistent with the assumed behavior.
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B Tables
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter/Value Moment1
 =
 
1
1:04
1=4
Annual real interest rate of 4 percent
 = 0:29 Capital income share
 =

0:95 0:05
0:256 0:744

Average length and number of expansions
and contractions of U.S. business sector
l = 0:85; h = 1  l = 0:15 Financial assets of brokers and dealers;Sensitivity analysis
1Sources of data: U.S. National Income and Product Accounts and U.S. Flow of Funds
accounts. Further details are provided in Section 4:1.
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Table 2: Jointly Calibrated Parameters
Panel A
Parameter Value
Share of nonnancial rms m = 0:65358
Depreciation rate  = 0:02578
Fixed factor income share  = 0:00342
Productivity parameters
nonnancial rms qm (s) = 0:98241
qm (s) = 0:94173
low-risk nancial rms ql (s) = 0:94177
ql (s) = 0:94175
high-risk nancial rms qh (s) = 1
qh (s) = 0:35547
Panel B
Moments Targeted1 Data Model
in % in %
Average value added share of corporate nonnancial sector 67:6 70:0
Average equity to asset ratio of the nancial sector 23:0 21:4
Average capital depreciation rate in economy 2:5 2:5
Average peak-to-trough decline in output during contractions2 6:4 8:5
Coe¢ cient of variation of output3 4:6 4:2
Coe¢ cient of variation of household net worth3 8:5 9:3
Average deposits over total household nancial assets 16:4 17:6
Recovery rate in bankruptcy 42:0 40:4
1Sources of data: U.S. National Income and Product Accounts and U.S. Flow of Funds
accounts. The recovery rate in bankruptcy is from Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2003).
2Total output is measured as the real value added for the U.S. business sector. We detrend
output by the average growth rate over the period 1947Q1 2015Q2. 3We calculate statistic
after detrending the variable by the average growth rate over the period 1987Q1  2015Q2.
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Table 3: Model Welfare and Risk Taking Relative to the Social Planner1
Experiment LTCE2 Risk taking3
in % in %
Optimal policy  0:5 percentage points at annual rate  0:0301  5:67
Optimal policy  0:2 percentage points at annual rate  0:0207 0:57
Optimal interest rate policy  0:0188 5:11
Optimal policy +0:2 percentage points at annual rate  0:0208 9:99
Optimal policy +0:5 percentage points at annual rate  0:0321 17:98
1The statistics are averages over 500 simulations of 750 periods each of the model econ-
omy and the social planners problem. 2Lifetime Consumption Equivalents (LTCE) is the
percentage decrease in the optimal consumption from the social planner problem needed to
generate the same welfare as the competitive equilibrium with a given interest rate policy.
3Risk taking is the percentage deviation in the amount of resources invested in the high-risk
projects in the competitive equilibrium relative to the social planners choice. The numbers
reported here are averages over expansions and contractions in our calibrated model. A pos-
itive number indicates too much risk taking, on average, relative to the social planner, while
a negative number indicates too little risk taking.
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Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis for Fraction of High Risk Intermediaries
Welfare and Risk Taking Results Relative to the Social Planner1
LTCE2 in %
Experiment / h value 0:13 0:15 0:17
Optimal policy  0:5 percentage points  0:0267  0:0301  0:0349
Optimal interest rate policy  0:0137  0:0188  0:0248
Optimal policy +0:5 percentage points  0:0295  0:0321  0:0364
Risk taking3 in %
Experiment / h value 0:13 0:15 0:17
Optimal policy  0:5 percentage points  7:92  5:67  3:70
Optimal interest rate policy 4:45 5:11 5:83
Optimal policy +0:5 percentage points 19:69 17:98 16:95
1The statistics are averages over 500 simulations of 750 periods each of the model economy
and the social planners problem. 2;3See denitions given in notes to Table 3.
49
C Figures
Figure 1: Timing of Model Events
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Figure 2: Simulation Results: Model with Optimal Interest Rate Policy and
Social Planner Allocations
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Figure 3: Model Welfare and Risk Taking Relative to the Social Planner
Deviations from optimal policy, in percentage points at annual rates
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Figure 4: Simulation Results: Model with Lower than Optimal Interest
Rates and Social Planner Allocations
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